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InJuly 1986, the authors, attorneys for a student advocacy organi-
zation, received a letter from a New York parent who wrote:
I have two children. One [my son] attends an elite [public] school....
My daughter, on the other hand, must spend her days at a [public]
school for throw-aways. An emotional crisis caused her to have poor
attendance in the ninth grade. She did not make an elite school. She
didn't even make an "ed op" school .... So now, she is in a school
where all the kids have serious attendance and academic problems.
While the kids are "enrolled," they have really dropped out. Everyone
in the place has problems-and I think the worst problem is that these
kids are totally isolated from kids who will stay in school and achieve.
My son says that when kids misbehave in his school, the threat is that
they have to go to my daughter's school .... Maybe someone might
care about "holding pens for rejects!" Maybe kids who need help
should be in a viable institution and occasionally see an achieving kid.
I wish I lived in the suburbs where both my kids could go to the same
school. My daughter's shame about herself, her classmates and her
school are a problem that no better teachers, better curriculum and
more accountability can overcome.
The New York City school system, like many other medium- and
large-sized school districts, runs a number of special "unzoned"
public high schools. This article explores how two students from
the same family could have such different experiences in the public
schools. Using New York City's school system as an example, the
article examines the problems raised by this mother's plea,
problems replicated in cities with magnet schools across the
country.
In New York City, the school system has three "tracks." Some
schools, like the son's, are as highly selective as the finest private
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schools; others, known as educational option ("ed op") or voca-
tional-technical schools,' are less selective. Both, however, screen
out students with poor grades or low attendance records. Students
not accepted at one of these selective schools go to schools in their
own neighborhoods. As this mother describes, this system produces
neighborhood schools with grave dropout problems and a dispro-
portionately high number of students with educational difficulties.
This mixed system of selective unzoned "magnet" and unselective
zoned schools has benefited some children, but only at the expense
of many others. The selectivity of the son's school, and others like
it, has exacerbated the problems afflicting schools like the daugh-
ter's. The concerned parent correctly asserts that isolation from
achieving students is the worst possible educational setting for her
daughter.
"Magnets" are so termed because they are intended to attract stu-
dents away from their neighborhood schools. The key characteris-
tics of a magnet school are: (1) a distinctive school curriculum
organized around a special theme or method of instruction; (2) vol-
untary enrollment elected by students and their parents; and (3) stu-
dents drawn from many attendance zones. Magnets are largely an
urban phenomenon, because a certain density of population is nec-
essary to permit multiple schools to serve the same geographical
area. 2 Magnets were initially developed to promote desegregation
by attracting students of different races from various school zones.
Experience has shown magnets also are often effective in improving
the quality of schools and increasing family choice.3 Magnets may
1. See text accompanying note 43, infra, for a discussion of New York City's educa-
tional option schools.
2. One-third of the nation's school districts enrolling 20,000 or more students use
magnets. Where magnets are used, they enroll, on average, five percent of all public
school students in that district, but the percentage is as high at 37% in some large cities.
Raywid, Family Choice Arrangements in Public Schools: A Review of the Literature, 55
Rev. of Educ. Research 435, 449 (1985).
3. Magnet programs are by far the most successful and widely implemented of the
educational choice models that have been proposed over the last two decades. Each of
the other choice models has serious disadvantages. Tuition tax credits and vouchers
offer no benefit to low-income families who cannot advance or pay the balance of the
tuition and would divert monies from the public schools. Even regulated voucher plans,
which would require schools to accept vouchers as full payment from poor families, fail
to deal with the complex issues involved in educating children with special needs, e.g.,
handicapped pupils, children of limited English proficiency, or homeless children. More-
over, the government regulations required to protect equity under a private voucher
system would undermine the freedom of choice and flexibility that are the scheme's
purposes. Open enrollment plans, as well as tuition tax credits, will not stimulate new





provide opportunities for school-based innovation and program de-
velopment by directly involving teachers in school reform. Magnets
also have the potential to attact new financial resources and students
to public education. Finally, magnets often enlist the support of
foundations and businesses in the development of a special theme,
such as computers, telecommunications, or engineering.
For all their potential benefits, magnets raise serious questions of
equity. These issues must be addressed if magnets are to succeed in
revitalizing school systems for the full range of students that the
public schools must educate. If magnets either siphon off those stu-
dents who are easiest to teach or receive a disproportionately high
percentage of available resources, the remaining schools become
places of last resort. Only the poor and those with special needs will
be left in the neighborhood schools. Not only is such a two-tiered
system unfair to individual students, but also it does little to stimu-
late reform in less advantaged neighborhood schools.
This article focuses on the potentials and dangers of magnet sys-
tems. Our viewpoint is that of attorneys who have participated in
efforts to make access to magnet schools in New York City more
equitable. In this article, we examine the origins and stated goals of
magnet schools as well as the failure of one particular set of magnet
schools in New York City high schools to achieve their goals. We
also examine a more successful program of junior high schools in
New York's Community School District Four in East Harlem. Dis-
trict Four offers a real choice between a wide variety of programs
without most of the inequities characteristic of the City's high school
magnet program.
In the final section of this article, we propose a model magnet
system that aims to maximize the educational and desegregative ef-
fects of magnet schools, while minimizing the inequities an inappro-
priately structured system can foster. In our model, every school
would be a magnet school in order to minimize selectivity and maxi-
mize choice. In addition, there would be: (1) district-level policy-
making, planning and coordination to ensure fairness, maximize in-
tegration, and provide a full range of programs; (2) involvement of
the public in the development of these policies; (3) adequate infor-
mation systems to inform all families of available options; and (4) a
mechanism to guarantee the equitable apportionment of resources.
With these protections in place, magnet schools would offer urban
communities the best chance for both promoting desegregation and
improving the quality of public education.
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I. Magnet Schools: Goals And Reality
The magnet school was developed as a means of implementing
desegregation. In Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg, decided in 1971,
the Supreme Court set out basic guidelines for urban school deseg-
regation and included magnet schools as an acceptable component
in an overall plan. 4 Since then, magnets have been used extensively
as part of court-ordered desegregation plans in Boston, St. Louis,
Buffalo, and other major American cities. 5 Other court-mandated
plans have made more modest use of magnets: for example, con-
verting one school in a minority neighborhood into a districtwide
magnet to attract white students.6
The 1976 amendments to the Emergency School Assistance Act
(ESAA) provided substantial federal funding for the creation of
magnet schools aimed at desegregation and integration. The availa-
bility of these funds vastly increased the use of magnets by school
districts, including many that were not under a court-ordered deseg-
regation plan. 7 As of 1982, there were roughly 138 school districts
running over 1,000 magnet schools across the country for the ex-
press purpose of promoting desegregation. In addition, there are
4. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
5. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1091 (1985) (St. Louis); United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 554 F. Supp.
912 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 1133 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (Buffalo).
Perhaps the most recent example of a court-ordered plan involving extensive use of
magnets is Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (Kansas City).
6. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. Sch. Dist. #21,512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975).
7. The Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. VII, 86 Stat. 235, 354
(1972), provided initial funding for magnet schools. The Education Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 321, 90 Stat. 2081, 2216-17 (1976), increased this funding
and the types of schools that were eligible for aid. Whereas in 1976 only 14 districts in
the country had magnet schools, by 1980, 100 districts had joined the bandwagon. In
fiscal year 1979, at the height of funding, the federal government spent $398.5 million
on magnet schools. The last year of the program was 1981-82. In 1981, the grants were
subsumed into the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Subtitle D
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 403-
commonly known at the Chapter Two Block Grants. The federal contribution to mag-
nets was drastically reduced. In Fiscal Year 1982, only $25.2 million was allocated for
this purpose. Although many of the 65 ESAA-funded magnet programs have cut back,
relatively few have disappeared in spite of the drastic reduction of funding. See R. Blank,
Survey of Magnet Schools: Analyzing a Model for Quality Integrated Education, Final
Report of a National Study for the U.S. Dept. of Education (1983) [hereinafter Blank].
In 1984, Congress allocated new funds for magnets in the Education for Economic Se-
curity Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1299 (1984). Because of delays by
the Department of Education in issuing regulations and an attempt by the federal Office
of Management and Budget to rescind funding, school districts received no funds under




approximately 10,000 "optional" public schools with many of the
same features as magnets."
A. Magnets as a Device to Promote Desegregation
In 1983, the United States Department of Education commis-
sioned a major national study of ESAA-funded magnet programs,
Survey of Magnet Schools: Analyzing a Model for Quality Integrated Educa-
tion (hereinafter National Magnet Study).9 This study found that na-
tionwide, 40% of the districts that developed magnet schools to
affect districtwide desegregation experienced positive results.' 0
Larger districts, districts experiencing population growth due to
new economic opportunities, and districts that were multiracial and
multiethnic had the most success desegregating with magnets."
The study also indicated that districts had a better chance for suc-
cessful desegregation if they used magnets as one aspect of a total
plan, which also included a variety of voluntary and involuntary de-
segregation methods such as pairing, rezoning, two-way busing, and
mandatory assignment. 12
For instance, in Buffalo, New York, which offers a broad array of
magnet choices, most students who do not choose a magnet will be
assigned to an integrated school outside their neighborhood for at
least half of their years in elementary school. 13 In Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, a "controlled-choice assignment policy" requires par-
ents to indicate their school choices in order of preference.
Assignments are then made on the basis of a variety of factors,
among them, ensuring stable desegregation. In effect, participation
in the desegregation program is mandated, but parents have a say in
where their children will go to school. Every student must choose a
8. Smith, Educational Options: What's Happening Today? in Magnet Schools:
Legal and Practical Implications 109 (N. Estes & D. Waldrip eds. 1978).
9. Blank, supra note 7. This two-year study involved 45 schools in 15 school districts,
nationwide, of which 11 were under court order to desegregate. All of the schools had
received ESAA funds to set up magnet schools for the purpose of desegregation.
10. Id. at 55.
11. Id. at 116.
12. Id. at 36.
13. See Gewirtz, Choice in Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728, 767-68 (1986) for a discussion of Buffalo as an example of
a successful court-ordered desegregation plan using magnets. The author suggests that
choice plans work best as a desegregation measure if they are treated as an experiment
with a mandatory, court-ordered "back-up" plan in case choice mechanisms fail to
achieve specified integration goals. This serves to give plaintiffs the commitment to cor-
rective action that they deserve and gives the community a necessary incentive to make
the choice plan work. Id. at 767.
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school, although one of the choices may be the neighborhood
school. 14
The element of choice in plans using magnet schools may have an
impact on the eventual success of efforts to desegregate. An unre-
leased federal study based on data collected between 1965 and 1985
concludes that while in the short-run voluntary magnet school plans
produce less desegregation than mandatory reassignment plans,
over time the voluntary plans produce greater interracial exposure
and, on average, half as much "white flight" as mandatory plans.' 5
Choice plus educational improvement is an attractive combina-
tion, one that may even unite some whites who traditionally have
opposed mandatory integration, and some blacks who have become
frustrated with the difficulty of achieving it. But conflict may be re-
duced at the cost of districtwide desegregation. In some districts,
magnets represent only a symbolic attempt to desegregate, particu-
larly where conflict over integration is intense and school officials
are unwilling or politically unable to press through the conflict.' 6
White parents may agree to send their children to desegregated
magnets but not to other desegregated schools. Whites then get
more than their fair share of seats in magnets, especially if the sys-
tem bends to white parents' pressure in order to prevent white
flight. Desegregated magnets certainly will not eliminate segrega-
tion in non-magnet schools. 17 The ultimate danger of magnets is
14. C. Rossell & C. Glenn, Controlled Parent Choice in Cambridge and Buffalo (Jan.
1987) (unpublished manuscript).
15. Plans were considered voluntary if they relied primarily on voluntary magnet
school enrollment and voluntary transfers from schools where the student was in the
majority to schools where the student was in the minority to reach desegregation goals.
Plans were considered mandatory if they relied mainly on reassignment of students to
achieve racial balance. A separate comparison of voluntary and mandatory plans in
predominantly minority large urban school districts found little difference in results be-
tween the two approaches. Snider, Voluntary Programs Said More Effective in Desegre-
gating, Educ. Week, Apr. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 1. However, where all assignments are
voluntary and the choice is between the segregated neighborhood school and a desegre-
gated magnet school, such plans do not have a significant effect on districtwide desegre-
gation except in districts where less than 30% of the population is minority. Rossell,
Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of School
Desegregation Plans, 12J. Legal Stud. 69, 73 (1983)..
16. Blank, supra note 7, at 91. The magnet survey gives the example of one district
where the Ku Klux Klan actually stood behind board members as they deliberated on a
magnet school settlement to a long-standing desegregation lawsuit. The plaintiffs, frus-
trated with years of pyrrhic court victories, agreed to the largely symbolic settlement.
17. As one political scientist has observed, white opponents of busing who enroll
their children in desegregated magnet schools are distinguishing implicitly between
middle-class and poor blacks. Hochschild, Approaching Racial Equality Through Indi-
rection: The Problem of Race, Class, and Power, 4 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 307, 308 (1986).
Magnets can result in integration opportunities for middle-class minority members while
lower-income minority group members remain in segregated schools that do not offer
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that they might achieve high quality education at a small number of
schools for a few mainly white or middle-class students, but only at
the expense of the others in the system.
Desegregation does not equal integration. The National Magnet
Study defined an integrated school as one in which there is equality
among students, intergroup respect, educative use of cultural differ-
ences, and inclusiveness towards all students. The survey found a
strong positive correlation between integration and high quality ed-
ucation. It also found that schools are more likely to be integrated if
they actually offer the course of study they are advertising and if at
least 25% of their population is made up of minority students.' 8
These findings confirm the well-recognized theory that a critical
mass of minorities is necessary to prevent feelings of isolation and
powerlessness among minority students.19
B. Magnets as a Device to Promote School Improvement
Although developed as a means of desegregation, magnet schools
have improved the overall quality of education as well. The National
Magnet Study concluded that magnets have the potential to provide
high quality education in urban settings. One-third of the schools
studied were deemed to be of high quality based on outcome indica-
tors, such as test scores, and observed school processes, such as stu-
dent-teacher interaction. Most of the other magnets rated high on
some of the criteria, although vast differences in educational quality
existed among schools.
High quality magnets have three things in common: (1) an en-
trepreneurial principal who exerts strong leadership in developing
curriculum and motivating students and staff; (2) coherence in
theme, curriculum, and teaching methods, which results in a strong
program identity; and (3) special treatment by the district, including
freedom from some district rules and procedures-what the Na-
tional Magnet Study calls "permission to be different." 20
the educational improvements of magnets, as illustrated by the New York City
experience.
18. Blank, supra note 7, at 97.
19. C. Willie, The Sociology of Urban Education 20 (1978). A recent study argues
that racial hostilities are highest when blacks and whites attend school in equal numbers.
The authors recommend that where the student population is biracial, black enrollment
should be either 20% to 40% or 60%. Schofield & Sagan, The Consequences of School
Desegregation, in The Consequence of School Desegregation 58, 72 (C. Rossell & W.
Hawledy eds. 1985).
20. Blank, supra note 7, at 55.
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Because students and parents choose magnet schools and are not
compelled to be there, magnets are also ideal "laboratories" for ex-
perimenting with new teaching methods, curricula, and school
structure. A magnet school can require additional time from stu-
dents beyond what is required by compulsory attendance laws (e.g.,
a commitment to community service or year-round attendance),
precisely because students can avoid the additional requirements by
choosing to attend some other public school. 2'
The process of choosing a school and, in some cases, being "cho-
sen" by it, can be a motivating factor not only for students but also
for teachers. The National Magnet Study found that teachers in
many of the most successful magnets were specially chosen for their
interest in, and commitment to, the theme of the school.
High quality magnets also engage teachers in curriculum develop-
ment, in sharp contrast to top-down educational reforms, for which
important educational decisions are made at the district or even the
state level. Encouraging participation in curriculum development is
good for teacher morale and may improve the quality of instruction.
Such participation, or "ownership," makes it easier for magnet
schools to attract competent, motivated teachers; in fact, the Na-
tional Magnet Study indicated that magnets employ more exper-
ienced teachers than other schools.2 2 In addition to teachers, a high
quality magnet also may involve the surrounding community, in-
cluding local businesses, in innovative ways not commonly found in
neighborhood schools. 23
One obvious difference between magnets and neighborhood
schools is that magnets cost on average 8% more.2 4 Recent court-
ordered desegregation plans have included elaborate magnet
schemes costing millions of dollars.25 Usually transportation and
the higher salaries of more experienced teachers are the sources of
the extra cost.2 6 Sometimes, however, the added expense is not due
to the costs of transportation and salaries; rather, it is due to at-
tempts to make inner city schools competitive with private and sub-
21. J. Goodlad, A Place Called School: Prospects for the Future (1983).
22. Blank, supra note 7, at 116.
23. Id. at 36.
24. The magnet survey pins the average excess per capita cost at $200 in 1982 buy-
ing power for the start-up year when there are one-time planning and equipment costs
and $59 per capita in subsequent years.
25. In Chicago, for example, the federal cousrt estimated the annual cost of that
magnet plan to be $171.6 million. United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,
554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983).




urban schools, in the hope of luring back whites. In Kansas City,
much of the cost is for repairing and refurbishing school build-
ings.2 7 The magnet remedy can serve as a device for the district to
get more government support for public education.2 8 One common
reason given for making a priority of keeping whites in public
schools is that "green follows white." But recent court cases' reme-
dies have called for increased spending evidently on the theory that
"white follows green."
Again, the danger is that magnets become so attractive that they
detract from the rest of the schools in a district. Skimming off the
best teachers or the highest achieving students, for instance, can
only be detrimental to neighborhood schools that do not have the
luxury of selecting students and may be held to more rigid rules
regarding teacher hiring.
C. Problems in the Current Implementation of Magnet Schools
Although the National Magnet Study found that magnets have
been used successfully to promote integration, it also offered in-
structive examples of how magnets can be utilized to obstruct, not
advance, integration. Some magnets serve as "shell games" to cre-
ate the mere appearance of desegregation. Some serve to relieve
pressure from courts and state agencies to desegregate. Some use
"elitist" selection criteria to reduce minority access to the best avail-
able learning opportunities. Others admit minority students but
then fail them and remand them to inferior schools.29 Even in de-
segregated magnets the danger remains that tracking within the
school will have resegregative effects. 30
Equitable access to magnet schools depends not only on fair se-
lection methods, but also on adequate information about the avail-
able options. Poor, non-English speaking, and illiterate families are
severely disadvantaged under traditional information systems. They
are often unaware even of those entitlement programs, such as food
27. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
28. Chicago and Kansas City have sought additional funds from the federal and state
governments respectively. Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 772.
29. Blank, supra note 7, at 92.
30. Ascher, Educ. Resources Info. Center/Clearinghouse on Urb. Educ. Digest, ED
269518, No. 3, Mar. 1986. Recent studies recommend heterogeneous groups and coop-
erative learning techniques, using teams of racially and academically mixed students
who work together on problems. This teaching method has yielded positive effects on
race relations, achievement, self-esteem, and concern for others. See, e.g., Slavin, Coop-
erative Learning, 41 J. Soc. Issues 45 (1985).
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stamps and welfare, that have simple eligibility criteria. 3 1 Unless
magnet systems include methods to make sure that families and stu-
dents receive information about their choices in an understandable
form, many children will be denied the choice opportunities. More-
over, the cost of preparing students to meet special qualifications,
and the time and travel necessary to find out about options and to
complete applications for admission, are obstacles for poor and
overburdened parents. 32 Finally, the timing of application processes
frequently prevents students new to an area from selecting special
programs. This works a serious injustice in school districts where
families are mobile and concentrations of immigrant and homeless
families are high.
While the National Magnet Study found that relatively few mag-
nets were selective, it did discover that 89% of magnets had some
method for weeding out students with severe academic or behav-
ioral problems. 33 Elite student bodies, in practice, if not intent, can
also result from student self-selection, school marketing strategies
directed at middle-class neighborhoods or higher achieving feeder
schools, and guidance practices that steer children to different
schools on the basis of their perceived abilities. 34 In addition, if
magnets fail to provide services for populations with special needs,
such as non-English-proficient or special education students, neigh-
borhood schools are left to meet the requirements of the legally
mandated programs for these populations. 35 The result can be dev-
astating for the schools that must take the students other schools
reject and for the students consigned to "dumping grounds."
In effect, the entire student body of these schools of last resort is
tracked into lower ability groups. Assignment to these schools es-
sentially tells the student, "We have lower expectations for you."
When this message is communicated to students by their teachers
and their schools, it has a real effect on their achievement. 36 A sub-
31. Olivas, Information Access Inequities: A Fatal Flaw in Educational Voucher
Plans, 1OJ. L. & Educ. 441 (1981).
32. For instance, in Pittsburgh, where magnet programs accept students on a first-
come, first-serve basis, parents camp out in the street for as long as six nights running to
enroll their children. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at A50, col. 5.
33. Blank, supra note 7, at 66.
34. Raywid, supra note 2, at 450.
35. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975); Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.93-380,
§ 105(a)(l), 88 Stat. 503 (1974); Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No.90-247, § 702, 81
Stat. 816 (1968).





stantial body of research on student tracking indicates not only that
low-achieving students do better when they are grouped heteroge-
neously, but that high-achieving students are not harmed and in-
deed can also profit from such groupings.3 7
The National Magnet Study concluded that the quality of magnet
schools is not related to the selectivity of the student admission pol-
icy. Only 13% of the schools studied either used devices such as
achievement test scores or grade averages to select students or sent
students back to their zoned school if they failed to meet perform-
ance requirements. The Study found that these selective schools
were not any more likely to be of high quality than schools that se-
lected students using the lottery method.38
The survey also found that public support for magnet programs is
stronger when application is based on interest and selection is by
lottery. It warned:
Local planners should be aware that student selectivity is a policy
choice. It should be faced openly and publicly in the earliest planning
stages and the policy debate should be inclusive of all groups. The
district that fails to do this may subsequently discover that its magnets
are perceived by many sectors of the community as elitist and inequita-
ble even when they are non-selective and widely inclusive....
Misperceptions arising out of insufficiently realized or sub rosa policy
debates on the issue tend to induce resentment and conflict from com-
munity groups who feel shut out and regular school personnel who
feel pushed aside and unjustly compared to what they perceive as ex-
clusive and favored magnets. Over time this can undermine the sup-
port accorded magnets and undercut their identity and definiteness
which are associated with educational quality.3 9
The above is an accurate depiction of the controversy that in fact
erupted in New York City when selective magnet schools were set
up without public discussion or even public dissemination of the
specific admission criteria to be applied. A 1985 Advocates for Chil-
dren study found that students in minority neighborhoods had far
worse admissions rates into selective schools than those who at-
tended predominantly white "feeder" schools. The most impover-
ished neighborhoods had the worst rates of all. 40
Similarly, a study of 44 magnet schools in Chicago showed that
middle-class students, including blacks, attend magnets at far higher
37. J. Oakes, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality (1986).
38. Blank, supra note 7, at 62.
39. Id. at 63.
40. Advocates for Children, Public High Schools: Private Admissions 35-39 (1985).
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rates than low-income students. 41 This was true even after admis-
sions procedures had been reformed to prohibit selective criteria at
all but six of the schools. The study attributed the under-represen-
tation of low-income students to screening that continued even
where it was officially prohibited, to selective recruitment, and to the
fact that, while the majority of students enrolled in magnets come
from the immediate surrounding neighborhoods, there are fewer
magnet opportunities close to the homes of poor students. Stu-
dents who attended magnet elementary schools in Chicago found it
easier to gain admission to magnet high schools. In fact, some ele-
mentary schools were set up to feed into the most prestigious high
school programs. Students were thus tracked early for acceptance
or rejection on the basis of socioeconomic status.
In predominantly minority school districts, access to magnet
schools is often an issue. Minority participation in magnet pro-
grams is sometimes limited to a proportion far smaller than the
group's representation in the overall school population. Dispropor-
tionate racial quotas may be imposed out of fear that whites will not
attend a school unless ensured a white majority, or policymakers
may believe that a school is not integrated unless whites are in the
majority.
The use of explicit racial classifications to prevent white flight, as
opposed to their use to correct past discrimination through affirma-
tive action, is extremely troubling but is at least straightforward.
There is no doubt that this practice is subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts. 4 2 But when admissions criteria rather than racial quotas re-
sult in disproportionately low minority participation, it can be diffi-
cult to determine whether the criteria were set high with the intent of
reducing minority enrollment or for a permissible purpose, which
simply has the effect of reducing minority enrollment. 43
II. Two Contrasting New York City Examples
The New York City school system provides examples of both the
advantages and the pitfalls of magnet school programs. On the one
hand, the citywide high school system has all the problems of a
poorly coordinated system of neighborhood schools and magnets
41. Allen, Nonselective Magnet Schools Use Selective Criteria, Chicago Rep., Apr.
1986, at 6-8.
42. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 1979); Parent Ass'n v.
Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 581 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984).
43. Federal regulations prohibit admissions criteria that have a discriminatory effect,




with various degrees of selectivity. On the other hand, East Har-
lem's Community School District Four's junior high school program
demonstrates the potential of an all-magnet system to give every
student a real choice.
Example A: An Abundance of Choice and Frustration in the Nation's
Largest Public School System
New York City's huge, 275,000 student, part-magnet high school
system, with its complex admissions procedures, demonstrates the
effects of developing a system without districtwide planning and co-
ordination.44 New York's system has created some islands of excel-
lence, but it has also undermined formerly effective neighborhood
schools, failed to improve weak institutions, and resulted in serious
inequities.
Each year over 90,000 entrants apply to a dazzling array of over
200 unzoned schools and programs featuring everything from "the
humanities" to "oil burner service and installation." Students must
list up to eight ranked choices on a complicated four-page form
used citywide. One-third of all applicants are not accepted at any of
their choices. 45 Through a separate procedure, some minority stu-
dents are given the opportunity to compete by lottery for a limited
number of seats in white-majority neighborhood schools. All other
students attend their zoned, comprehensive-academic high schools
or private schools. Students who fail to meet the application dead-
line or enter the school system after the deadline has passed must
attend their zoned school.
The information system available to explain these complex op-
tions is inadequate. The information on which students base their
choices is limited. Applicants receive, on average, 20 minutes of a
guidance counselor's time.46 A 324-page directory lists available
programs and, in some cases, required courses within the programs.
However, it does not describe program content in detail, nor does it
44. Two complementary studies of choice in New York City high schools are: Edu-
cational Priorities Panel, Lost in the Labyrinth: New York City High School Admissions
(1985) (analyzing the mechanisms for applying to schools and the availability of infor-
mation and counseling); and Advocates for Children, supra note 40 (analyzing admis-
sions criteria and integration policy and their effect on low-income and minority
students). A third study that analyzes the city's integration policy in the light of applica-
ble case law and compares inputs and outcomes in integrated and segregated city high
schools is Education Law Project, Columbia Law School, Promoting Integration in the
New York City High Schools (1987).
45. Educational Priorities Panel, supra note 44, at 5.
46. Id. at 45.
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indicate what admissions criteria, if any, are used.4 7 A curriculum,
prepared by the central board for districts to use with students
before they apply, focuses on the process of making a choice rather
than on the content of specific programs. Sending schools, in most
cases, have no more information than parents and students can get
from the directory. Once a year, a citywide fair is held at which
every high school runs a booth. High schools may also hold open
houses for parents or make presentations at parent meetings. Such
recruitment tends to be done selectively, however, with the high
schools' targeting junior highs and neighborhoods seen as particu-
larly desirable.
Although high schools are centrally administered in New York
City, this part-magnet high school system was developed without a
coordinated plan. The Board of Education never considered the
impact that the creation of a program for some select students
would have on other schools and students. Instead, many individual
decisions were made that turned a system of mainly zoned, compre-
hensive high schools into a system in which: (1) virtually every
zoned school also runs unzoned selective programs; (2) nearly every
vocational school offers highly technical and relatively selective ca-
reer programs; (3) several zoned schools have been closed down
and redesigned as unzoned schools with selective criteria; (4) new
"theme" high schools selectively accept students on a boroughwide
or citywide basis; and (5) highly selective programs in fields such as
medical science compete for the city's most gifted students. Most of
the decisions to create such programs were made on an ad hoc basis
without significant public discussion or consideration of systemwide
effects. The issues that were discussed the least, until recently, are
who sets admission criteria and what criteria are appropriate.
Programs handpick applicants from computer printouts of appli-
cations that indicate test scores, attendance, grades, specific course
work, and participation in special education, bilingual, or gifted pro-
grams. Educational options schools (or programs) are required to
take a certain number of students with below-average reading
scores.4 8 Other schools, however, are permitted to set their admis-
sions criteria as high as they wish. Generally, the more popular the
program, the higher the criteria.
47. New York City Board of Educ., Directory of the Public High Schools, September
1987. A program in "Health Career Professions," for instance, is described as including
courses in hematology, crytology, and histology. These are not exactly household words
in most New York City homes.




The cumulative effect of these programs has been devastating to
many neighborhood zoned schools in the city. The selective pro-
grams decline to take students with poor grades or attendance while
attracting the highest achieving students away from zoned schools.
These programs also have strict limits on their enrollment and can
know in May whom to expect in September. In contrast, zoned
schools are frequently overcrowded and must take hundreds of
"over the counters" who show up throughout the year, including
transfers who have not succeeded at the selective schools. As the
Schools Chancellor and Board of Education President acknowl-
edged in a letter to the editor published in the New York Times:
"Nearly a third of all high school students are attend[ing] schools
with selection criteria. Those schools are succeeding at the expense
of the majority of schools which continue to do poorly." 49
In the fall of 1986, the New York City Board of Education insti-
tuted some reforms to address this problem. 50 First, schools must
publish their admissions criteria, in order to help students make
more realistic choices and hold schools accountable for their
method of selection. Second, each educational option school must
select one-half of its entering class by lottery. As a result, these pro-
grams will enroll, for the first time, some students with serious edu-
cational problems. Students will continue to be admitted in three
reading test categories-below-average, average, and above-aver-
age-with half of the entrants in each category hand-selected and
half picked by lottery. Depending on how schools handle their
hand-selection, they may have 67% of their entrants reading above
the citywide mean.51 In contrast, at many zoned schools, the vast
majority of students read below the mean. Third, all schools are
prohibited from using school-devised entrance examinations or in-
49. Nuzum, Litow, Wagner & Quinones, New York Can Have School Excellence and
Excellent Schools, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at A26, col. 5.
50. Board of Education of the City of New York, Div. of High Schools, High School
Memorandum No. 38, Re: Admissions Policies for the Selection of Students to
Screened and Educational Options Schools and Programs (Oct. 6, 1986).
51. The new rule provides for student selection to reflect the normal distribution of
reading test scores among applicants. Thus, 16% are to be selected from among appli-
cants scoring more than one standard deviation above the mean, 68% from those scor-
ing between one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above the mean,
and 16% scoring more than one standard deviation below the mean. Id. However, half
of the students in each category are handpicked, and, in the past, schools have generally
handpicked students at the top end of their test category. Thus, it is expected that in the
middle test category, all of the handpicked students, will be reading above the mean.
Hence admissions will be skewed toward students reading above the mean.
305
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 5:291, 1987
terviews to screen candidates. 52 Finally, in response to findings that
special-needs students are excluded from many programs, the
Board of Education has ordered that seats be set aside for limited-
English speaking students and students with handicapping
conditions. 53
These modest reforms were passed in the face of vociferous op-
position from principals and parents at selective schools who feared
the changes would destroy their programs. At least one education
expert warned that "it is hard to create good schools but easy to
ruin them."' 54 The Board of Education will carefully monitor admis-
sions results in 1987 to determine the effect of these changes.
Clearly, a number of serious equity issues remain unresolved in
the New York City high school system. For the non-lottery spots,
schools are still allowed to set their own admissions criteria. Some-
times these are absurdly high. 55 An earlier plan to create "clusters"
of programs with similar themes and coordinated admissions crite-
ria has not yet been instituted. There is no effective monitoring of
the geographic distribution of acceptance; schools are free to bypass
low-income neighborhoods, and they frequently do. Particularly
troubling are the quotas used to limit minority enrollment at a
number of special programs; minority enrollment is often capped at
50% even though 80% of the school population citywide is black,
Hispanic, or Asian.56
The genesis of present racial ceilings in New York City can be
traced to high school "Choice of Admissions Plans." In the mid-
52. These devices were only banned after two studies found that school-adminis-
tered tests were a patchwork quilt of unvalidated questions from various standardized
tests that were not validated for their use in admissions and that interviews were often
used to determine the race of the applicant. Advocates for Children, supra note 40, at 17-
19. F. Smith, University Consultants Report on High School Admissions for the New
York City Board of Education 28-29 (1986).
53. Board of Education of the City of New York, Div. of High Schools, High School
Memorandum No. 99, Re: Admissions for Limited English Proficient Students to Edu-
cational Option High Schools and Unit Trade Vocational High Schools and ... Admis-
sion for Special Education Students to Educational Option Schools and Educational
Option Programs (Feb. 25, 1987). The policy for LEP students is that at least 6% of all
offers by each selective program should go to this population and that full bilingual
programs should be set up in the 13 schools most in demand among major language
groups. Special education students are permitted to apply to either regular education or
separate, self-contained, special education programs; however, they are always admitted
to the special education program and considered for mainstreaming only when they ar-
rive at the high school. At least 6% of all seats in vocational and career programs are
supposed to be reserved for special education students in self-contained programs.
54. Ravitch, Making Good Schools Worse, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at A31, col. 1.
55. Advocates for Children, supra note 40, Appendix.




1970s, the Board of Education abandoned attempts to integrate two
all-minority high schools in Brooklyn and Queens and instead made
seats in white majority schools available by lottery to students zoned
for the segregated schools. Seats are limited so that the integrated
schools do not dip below 50% white enrollment and so that the ra-
cial composition changes no more than four percent annually in or-
der to prevent "white flight." Many students seeking an integrated
school experience are turned away. 57
Because the number of seats available to minorities must equal or
remain below the number of non-Hispanic whites attending school,
opportunities for minorities decline as the percentage of whites in
the system declines. Board of Education statistics reveal a steady
decline over the past 20 years of about one percentage point per
year in the proportion of whites in the system. 58 At the same time,
the number of students seeking an integrated education who are not
accepted by one of their first four choices in the Choice of Admis-
sions Program has increased, in some cases dramatically. 59 The
Board will permit white-majority schools to be underutilized, even
in the face of overcrowding at segregated schools, rather than tip
the racial balance at a school by admitting additional minority stu-
dent volunteers from the overcrowded school zones. When the pro-
portion of white students within a white-majority zone appears to be
dipping below the 50% mark, the Board uses optional assignment
plans to encourage minority students within the zone to apply to
other schools for "stabilization" purposes. 60
Minority-group parents at Andrew Jackson High School in
Queens challenged the Choice of Admissions Program in federal
court. Parent groups at Jackson High School and at Erasmus Hall
High School in Brooklyn initially had been successful in appealing
the Program to the New York State Commissioner of Education, but
the Commissioner later reversed himself and ordered the Program
to continue. The district court found that the Program recreated a
dual school system in which some schools were integrated while
Jackson remained segregated, and ordered the Board of Education
57. Advocates for Children, supra note 40, at 42.
58. New York City Board of Education, School Profiles, 1982-83 (1986).
59. For example, in 1977, no student designating the segregated Andrew Jackson
High School as a fourth or lower choice was assigned there. But in the 1985-86 school
year, 264 such students were assigned to Jackson. Office of Zoning and Integration,
New York City Board of Education, Computer Final: Andrew Jackson Optional Assign-
ment Program 1985-86, (Sept. 1986).
60. Advocates for Children, supra note 40, at 23-24.
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to desegregate. 61 The appeals court ruled that, in a voluntary inte-
gration plan not ordered by any court, it was permissible to set quo-
tas on racial minority participation in order to prevent "white
flight," but that the Board had to prove that each component of its
Program was necessary to maintain integration and that there was
no less restrictive alternative. 62 On remand to the district court, the
Program was ruled invalid because there was found to be no factual
justification for the 50% tipping point. 6 3 When this finding was ap-
pealed, the Second Circuit remanded for still more findings, ruling
that the lower court's interpretation of statistical data was errone-
ous.6 4 The case remains, unresolved, on the district court docket.
The Choice of Admissions Program considered in the Jackson case
randomly assigned students to non-selective comprehensive schools
in other attendance zones. Since the court ruling, without public
discussion, New York City school officials have extended the imposi-
tion of racial ceilings to unzoned programs that offer special courses
of study not available at the comprehensive high schools and to
schools that select students based on academic achievement. It is
thus New York City's avowed practice to ensure that non-Hispanic
whites have greater access to magnet programs than racial and eth-
nic minorities.
This practice is not found in any written Board of Education pol-
icy but is freely acknowledged by Board officials. 65 They offer two
justifications. The first is that the establishment of highly selective
programs with a guaranteed proportion of white students has
brought whites back to schools in which changing demographics
previously had resulted in declining white enrollments. School offi-
cials argue that once the white population declines to below 50%,
all whites rapidly flee, leaving behind a racially identified school.
This argument relies on the same premise that was challenged in the
Jackson case. By giving whites preference for seats in special pro-
grams, they prevent the school from tipping and thus prevent white
flight. This argument is flawed. The School Board has provided no
61. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 451 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
62. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 577-79 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the
litigation history of the case and the findings of the District Court).
64. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit approved a similar Chicago Plan after it was
adjusted so that minority students turned away from the nearest schools to prevent
white flight were guaranteed busing to integrated schools elsewhere. Johnson v. Chi-
cago, 567 F. Supp 290 (N.D.I1I. 1983).
65. Advocates for Children, supra note 40, at Appendix. Also see Education Law Pro-




evidence to suggest that whites are not willing to send their children
to predominately non-white schools if the programs are attractive
and the school population is multiethnic. East Harlem's magnet
schools illustrate that whites are willing to send their children to
such schools. 66
The Board also argues that the racial ceilings in selective pro-
grams actually expand access for minorities, because schools are re-
quired to bend their admissions criteria if necessary to meet the
quota. The argument is, in effect, that a system that sets explicit
racial ceilings may be less burdensome to minorities than one that
reduces minority opportunity by setting admissions criteria high
enough to exclude all but the most gifted or economically ad-
vantaged blacks and Hispanics. The latter practice is a common
ploy for limiting minority enrollment. 67 But neither disproportion-
ately low racial ceilings nor inflated admissions criteria are
justifiable.
The New York City high school system inadequately serves the
needs of its students. The selection procedures are overly complex,
information systems are inadequate, and integration policies un-
fairly limit opportunities for minorities. There are some fine indi-
vidual schools, but the mixed system of selective unzoned schools
and nonselective zoned schools has sabotaged the zoned schools
most in need of help. The incremental reforms passed in the last
year are intended to make access to unzoned schools more equita-
ble, but they do not address the basic flaws of the mixed system.
Example B: A Place for Everyone in the East Harlem "Alternative
Concept"Junior High Schools
The "alternative concept" junior high schools run by Community
School District Four, which serves East Harlem, provide a sharp
contrast to the immense, complicated New York City high school
system.68 The District Four program is notable because all of its
66. See infra note 72.
67. Blank, supra note 7, at 92.
68. The information on District Four's program is derived from interviews by J.
Stern with District officials at the Office of Community School District Four, and written
materials provided by the District on file with the authors, as follows: Telephone inter-
view with Dori Collazo, Director, Bilingual Education, District Four (Feb. 17, 1987);
telephone interview with John Tainsch, Office of Funded Programs, District Four (Feb.
12, 1987); interview with John Falco, Director, Office of Alternative Concept Schools,
District Four (Feb. 10, 1987); interview with Seymour Fliegel, Deputy Superintendent,
District Four (Feb. 10, 1987); New York City Community School District Four, Decisions
About 7th Grade: 1986 (undated) (mimeograph); New York City Community School
District Four Alternative Concept Schools (undated) (mimeograph); East Harlem Mag-
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junior high schools are unzoned, and students can attend the school
of their choice. 69 Most schools have special themes or unique teach-
ing philosophies that contribute to their ability to attract students.
The district's strategy of deliberately keeping "alternative concept"
programs small was initiated in the mid-1970s and has received con-
siderable favorable publicity.70 The programs are also credited with
raising the district's reading scores. 7 1 The alternative concept jun-
ior high schools are intended to accommodate students' individual
needs by: (1) drastically reducing the size of the educational unit;
(2) offering a variety of themes and teaching methods; (3) encourag-
ing educational innovation at each of the individual schools; (4) in-
creasing staff participation in decision-making; and (5) facilitating
and stimulating greater parental involvement in education. Some of
the programs achieve voluntary racial integration by attracting white
children from private schools and neighboring districts. These pro-
grams receive some federal magnet school funds and are primarily
located on the boundaries of the district.7 2
This small school district operates its magnet alternative pro-
grams with both district-level planning and school-centered,
net School Project 1987-88, District Four, Application for Funding under the Magnet
Schools Assistance Program (undated); and Community School District Four, Reading
Summary Statistics (Spring 1986).
69. Community School Board District Four has jurisdiction over the public elemen-
tary and junior high schools within its district. The district enrolls approximately 14,000
students. Fifty-nine percent of the District's students are Hispanic, 37% black, and only
4% white. About 11,000 of the students receive free or reduced lunch. Interview withJ.
Tainsch and S. Fliegel, supra note 68.
The alternative concept program was started in the mid-1970s. The students at the
junior high level choose from a variety of programs, including schools specializing in
math and science, the performing arts, maritime study, as well as programs for students
with learning and math problems.
Small size is a key aspect of the District's approach to junior high school level educa-
tion; the alternative concept junior high schools range from less than 100 to under 300,
in contrast to regular New York City junior high schools that may have 1,000 to 2,000
students. This reflects the district's belief that "most large junior high school behavior
is not acceptable; in small environments we can achieve the degree of decorum neces-
sary for learning." The district now has five alternative concept schools at the elemen-
tary level; however, most elementary school-age pupils attend their zoned school.
Interview with S. Fliegel, supra note 63.
70. See, e.g., A. Bastian, N. Fruchter, M. Gittell, C. Greer & K. Haskins, Choosing
Equality: A Report of the New World Foundation 76, 77 (1985); Fishman, Middle Class
Parents' Guide to the Public Schools, New York Magazine, Jan. 13, 1986, at 28, 29;
Ellison, A School District With Choices, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1985, at 27,
col. 4; Schools That Dare to Compete, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at B3, col. I; Maeroff,
Exploring Alternatives in East Harlem Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1982, at A l, col. 7.
71. See, e.g., Schools that Dare to Compete, supra note 70.
72. East Harlem Magnet Project 1987-1988, supra note 68, at 2. In 1985-86, the




teacher-based innovation. The initiative for creating individual pro-
grams usually is generated by teachers at the local school level; how-
ever, there is overall district planning to ensure that the programs
meet the range of district needs and respond to student and parent
interest.73
A potential obstacle to a successful magnet school system is devel-
oping an effective plan for informing the public of options, advan-
tages, and selection processes. The information dissemination
system in effect in District Four suggests that this obstacle can be
overcome.74 Over time, an information system has been designed
for implementing parental choice that appears to meet the needs of
the district's low-income community. In the sixth grade all students
and their parents are required to choose junior high schools for the
following year. There are special orientation sessions for sixth
grade teachers, who are crucial in ensuring informed choice. Since
the teachers know the individual students and are familiar with the
district's programs, they are able to give personal counseling.75
There are meetings with parents conducted in English and Spanish,
and a two-week school visitation period. A booklet entitled Decisions
About Seventh Grade, describing the program in straightforward, sim-
ple English and Spanish, is given each year to students and their
parents. The system has been in operation for thirteen years, so
much information is available to parents by word-of-mouth. The
students make six choices, in order of preference, on an uncompli-
cated, one-page form that is countersigned by the parent, teacher,
and principal. 76 The form includes special student interests and
abilities, standardized test scores, and teacher recommendations.
The East Harlem system provides the great majority of its stu-
dents with a real choice. Students are selected by the receiving
school directors, who hand-select based mainly on the sending
schools' appraisals of who would do well in a particular program.
Only a few programs have more specific entrance criteria. The di-
73. Interviews with S. Fliegel, J. Falco, supra note 63.
74. Another example of an effective information system is the school system in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. There the state funds a parent liaison in every school.
75. Interviews with S. Fliegel,J. Falco & D. Collazo, supra note 56. According to Ms.
Collazo, the District Four Director of Bilingual Education, the district's information sys-
tem does reach non-English-speaking parents. She did raise concerns, however, about
how the choice system worked for families newly arrived in the District.
76. Decisions About 7th Grade, supra note 63, at 54.
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rectors actually meet together to divide up the entering class. Gen-
erally, students are accepted into one of their top three choices. 77
While the opportunity for choice is encouraging, the District Four
program does raise certain concerns about tracking and limiting op-
portunities for some children. There are extreme variations in the
reading and math scores among the various middle schools. For in-
stance, in 1986 the percentages of seventh grade students reading at
or above grade level in alternative concept schools ranged from
highs of 97.7, 97.3, and 90.0, to lows of 30.0, 36.8, and 42.1.78
These statistics, coupled with the small, homogeneous nature of
each program and the deliberate counseling of students toward pro-
grams geared to their perceived ability level, indicate a degree of
tracking. Ten percent of the district's students are of Limited Eng-
lish Proficiency (LEP) and a majority of its school population is His-
panic. However, LEP students and others who want a bilingual
program cannot enroll in the alternative concept programs. In-
stead, they may choose from three bilingual junior high school pro-
grams. Those LEP students who wish to enroll in alternative
concept schools are given language assistance. 79 More disturbing is
the situation for the 10% of the district's students who, because of
handicapping conditions, are assigned to special education. They
do not participate in the choice system at all, but are administra-
tively assigned to separate programs located in the district's
schools.8 0
Yet the East Harlem schools can point to considerable success.
These junior high schools provide the varying types of education
that a heterogeneous student body needs. Teachers counsel their
students in the selection and assignment processes. Parents also
participate in the procedure. Thus the East Harlem schools are able
to provide a diverse, yet cohesive, system that serves student needs.
77. According to district officials, early in the history of District Four's alternative
concept schools, there were hundreds of complaints from students each fall who wished
to transfer. Presently, because of the increased level of knowledge and the attention
given by the schools to the selection and assignment process, there are very few com-
plaints. The officials also attribute their success to the fact that the alternatives are all
real choices, and to the district's willingness to close programs that fail. Interviews with
S. Fliegel, J. Falco & D. Collazo, supra note 63. Similarly, in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
district officials changed leadership at schools that were not attracting students. Rossell
& Glenn, supra note 14, at 20, 21.
78. Reading Summary Statistics, supra note 63. This comparison excludes programs
for students with learning and adjustment problems.
79. Interview with D. Collazo, supra note 63.




III. A Model Magnet System
In order to improve some schools without destroying others,
magnets must be part of a coherent, districtwide scheme. Where
desegregation is court-mandated, it often takes the form of a combi-
nation of strategies, including mandated-school reassignments and
magnet alternatives. 81 Or the court may take a carrot and stick ap-
proach with mandated reassignment as the back-up plan if a magnet
program fails to meet integration goals.82 In either case, the mixed
system may work well if it is well planned and has the power of a
court order behind it. In contrast, school board-initiated integra-
tion plans are generally the product of political compromise.
School officials rarely have the political power to mandate reassign-
ment for integration purposes. 83
Unfortunately, voluntary integration plans without choice incen-
tives accomplish little. In a system of neighborhood schools, in-
come and housing segregation may severely limit integration
opportunities or place all the burden on minorities through one-way
busing. In a mixed system of neighborhood schools and magnets,
without mandated assignments, zoned schools may become dump-
ing grounds for students not admitted to magnets.
However, if everyone goes to a school of his or her choice, as the
case of District Four demonstrates, presumably no one goes to a
school of last resort. If everyone has to choose a school in order to
go to school at all, and if the sending schools take responsibility for
ensuring that informed choices are made for every child, then the
disadvantages of children with less sophisticated or aggressive par-
ents are mitigated, and the benefits of choice and the burdens of
travel are distributed more fairly among all classes and races.
We believe a system of magnet schools could be developed that
would avoid the problems the New York City high schools now have
and would emulate the best features of District Four's junior high
school program. Such a system would meet the needs of a diverse
city's student-age population without sacrificing the education of
some for the good of others.
81. See Gewirtz, supra note 13.
82. See Hoschschild, supra note 17.
83. See Raywid, supra note 2.
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A. District-Level Responsibilities
The district must assume responsibility for overall planning and
coordination of magnet programs.8 4 Coordinated planning is es-
sential to assure a range of options that meets the needs of the total
school population and takes into account such issues as geographic
balance and program popularity. (For instance, the district must
consider replicating oversubscribed programs.) Most important,
centralized planning must assess the impact that the creation of each
magnet will have on the system's other schools. New York City's
high school system demonstrates the problems that occur when cen-
tral planning is not done. In that system, capped enrollments at
magnet schools have resulted in overcrowding at others. The lack
of planning has resulted in, for example, highly popular programs
being duplicated in some boroughs, while other boroughs have
none.
Central policies must also be formulated at the district level to
ensure fairness and equity. Plans for racial integration, mandates to
safeguard the rights of vulnerable populations with special needs,
due process protections in discipline and transfer procedures, and
systems to respond to districtwide issues such as homelessness, mo-
bility, and the influx of new immigrants all require centrally deter-
mined policymaking.
Centralized planning does not necessarily require uniformity.
Rather, district policies should be sufficiently flexible to allow the
design of a school to reflect the imperatives of the particular com-
munity and to encourage local initiatives. However, this flexibility
cannot be permitted to favor one neighborhood at the expense of
another or to undermine basic equity and due process rights. Nor
should policies be so complicated that they cannot be commonly un-
derstood or they will be perceived as being unfair.
The planning process of magnet schools also must be open to de-
bate, involving both the public and the school community. Within
the basic framework established centrally, the community should
participate in determining the mission-the theme or educational
philosophy-of each magnet school.
84. The Director of the Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity of the Massachu-
setts Department of Education calls this type of district control "conditional choice" and
emphasizes that a central coordinating office must be responsible for providing current
and accurate information. Glenn, Putting Choice to Work for Public Education, 2 Eq-




Although school-level initiatives should be encouraged, guaran-
teeing that every school teaches essential facts, skills, and concepts
is a district-level responsibility. The district must be willing to reor-
ganize schools that fail to teach the essentials or that few students
choose; otherwise, the schools that fail to attract students will be-
come dumping grounds. A magnet system will not achieve district
reform unless each school represents a real choice and each student
is given a real choice.
B. School-Level Responsibilities
The opportunity to encourage school-based educational initia-
tives is a major asset of magnet systems. The structure of a magnet
school program should place at the school level decision-making for
such matters as school organization, teaching methods, teaching
materials, and even curriculum (within broad standards set cen-
trally). The involvement of teachers, parents, and older students
should be maximized.
It is essential that flexibility and school-level involvement extend
to all schools in the system, not just a few select institutions. Other-
wise the schools that educate those easiest to teach will be afforded
maximum autonomy and the opportunity for creativity, while the
other schools will be forced to operate under narrow, centrally dic-
tated policies. The magnet system's structure should ensure that all
students in the system benefit from school-level resourcefulness.
C. Information Systems
If a magnet system is to present true opportunities to all students,
information must be made available in a manner that allows real
choice. While there are inherent difficulties in reaching some
groups, programs such as District Four's in East Harlem demon-
strate that low-income and language-minority parents can be
reached. Application requirements and procedures should be as
simple as is practical, with information about the process and the
range of options widely distributed. The key element in successful
information dissemination, however, is the sending schools. The
sending schools must be knowledgeable about the options, in a po-
sition to advise students and families, and responsible for providing
the information. At the same time, the magnet schools must be held
accountable to the district for ensuring that their sending schools
are provided with adequate information. The district must give
315
Yale Law & Policy Review
both the sending and the magnet schools the resources necessary
for this purpose.
Both the schools and the district must be prepared to adjust their
information systems in response to the changing conditions of the
district and local community, e.g., language needs, new arrivals,
changing demographics. Information dissemination must be a
planned element of the magnet structure, and resources must be
allocated accordingly in order to carry out this function.
D. Admissions Criteria and Procedures
Selective admissions criteria should never be used by popular
magnet programs simply because the demand for seats outweighs
the supply. Nor should acceptance into a specific program be re-
garded as a reward to students for prior performance. The promise
of such a reward cannot be kept when, as in some New York City
schools, there are 10 applicants for every seat. Furthermore, the
mission of public schools must be to serve students with less-than-
perfect records and special needs, as well as high-achieving, well-
behaved students. The goal of the American public school system is
to provide an education to every child; thus no child is entitled to a
more effective education than another.
Admissions to magnet programs should be based solely on inter-
est. Students who select a particular school as their first choice
should be the first to be admitted there. If demand outweighs avail-
ability of seats, students should be assigned by lottery, again with
first-choice selections being given priority. System-wide goals, such
as integrating special education students, can be met by "stratified
random selection," i.e., grouping applicants within categories and
employing a lottery for seats available within each category. This is
also a useful way to ensure the desired range of achievement levels
among entrants.
Since most magnets are not highly selective, it would not be an
impossible task to assimilate some harder-to-educate students
within individual schools. Moreover, providing a student with a
good program in a school of his or her choice is likely to reduce
academic, attendance, and behavior problems. There should be one
track and one set of expectations for all students, with special-needs
students receiving supplemental services.
Although the general rule must be against selectivity, there may
be instances where certain selection criteria can be justified. The




middle-class students to an impoverished minority neighborhood is
by offering an advanced academic program. Selectivity also might
be justified for a music or art program intended to help talented
youngsters, including those whose families could not afford private
lessons, meet their full potential. But when a program clearly re-
quires a certain level of ability or achievement, the school must be
able to justify its admissions criteria to the district and to the public
in objective terms, in writing. The federal civil rights guidelines,
which limit criteria to those that can be validated as necessary for
participation, are a good yardstick for all theme programs and, ar-
guably, are legally binding whenever the school's theme is related to
a vocation.8 5 The guidelines prohibit any admissions criterion that
results in the disproportionate exclusion of applicants based on
gender, race, ethnicity, a handicapping condition, or limited English
proficiency, unless the school district can show that the criterion is
essential for participation in that particular program.
The New York State Education Department has used this test,
looking to effect rather than intent, to require a wide range of New
York City magnets to admit students with limited English profi-
ciency.86 The guidelines also have been used successfully in New
Jersey to fashion a consent decree guaranteeing equitable access to
non-English speaking students. 87 The guidelines also prohibit dis-
criminatory impact in recruitment and counseling and in the appli-
cation process itself.
No school should be permitted to set its admissions policy unilat-
erally, but every school should be represented when admissions pol-
icies are determined at the district level. The actual selection and
assignment of students also must be done at the district level. It is
impossible to enforce limits on selectivity or to meet districtwide
goals for racial or economic integration without district control over
assignments. Naturally, each school looks out for its own interests
and wants the strongest possible student body. No particular mag-
net school has a stake in assuring that individual students obtain the
placement most appropriate for them. The district, in contrast, is
responsible for each child, is obligated to place each child, and
85. Most if not all "theme" programs in New York City, and elsewhere, are covered
under federal civil rights guidelines for vocational programs. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services: Guidelines for Eliminating Discrimination and Denial of Services on
the Basis of Race, Color, National Origin, Sex and Handicap, 25 C.F.R. § 80, Appendix
B (1986).
86. New York State Dep't of Education, Letter of Findings (Sept. 24, 1985) (on file
with authors).
87. Berrios v. Board of Educ., CA No. 80-3211 (D.NJ. Julyl, 1981).
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therefore has a greater incentive to ensure fairness and to ensure
that some schools do not thrive at the expense of others.
E. Integration Policy
Ideally an all-magnet system should have as many integrated
schools as possible. Historically, a school system has been consid-
ered desegregated once the racial composition of its schools
roughly reflects that of the district as a whole. But when the school
district is overwhelmingly made up of minority students, it may not
be possible to spread white enrollment throughout the schools in
the district. Courts have ruled that school districts may put dispro-
portionately low ceilings on minority enrollment in integrated
schools and permit disproportionately high enrollment by whites in
order to prevent white flight. The courts have required, however,
that such plans be narrowly tailored so that they restrict minority
participation no more than is necessary to meet the permissible goal
of retaining whites. s8
Plans that require white majorities in every integrated school sys-
temwide cannot meet this narrowly tailored requirement. The no-
tion of guaranteeing whites at least half the seats in a school is based
on the experience of biracial, black-white school districts in the
South. But today, many urban school districts are multiracial. This
multiraciality offers schools an opportunity to distribute students in
such a way that no one ethnic/racial group is in the majority, and
participation rates approximate more closely representation in the
overall population.
The notion of a white majority being required to prevent white
flight is also based on experience with mandatory assignment of stu-
dents to regular neighborhood schools lacking special programs. It
may well be unnecessarily restrictive for voluntary programs with
distinctive themes to be required to keep white enrollment at an ar-
bitrary level. If the district uses disproportionate racial ceilings at
all, the decision should be made on a school-to-school basis. A
school that offers a theme that is attractive to certain whites may be
able to attract them to the school even if they will be in the minority.
However, in order to attract whites to a more typical school in a
minority neighborhood, the district may have to guarantee them a
large proportion of seats in the school. In addition, magnet school
plans should not put all the burden of travel on minority students.
88. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1979);Johnson v. Chicago, 604




Where residential segregation exists, it is important that magnets be
designed to attract whites into minority neighborhoods, as well as
minorities into white neighborhoods.
Disproportionately low ceilings on minority participation are le-
gally impermissible for unique programs in the school system.
There may not be a fundamental right to attend any particular
school, but students cannot be denied equal educational opportu-
nity based on what courts have termed a "suspect classification." 89
In a city with a declining white population, there is no reason to
have an all-white or white-identified school. However, schools with
no white students may be unavoidable. When it is not possible to
integrate every school, it is essential that segregated schools get the
same, if not greater, resources as integrated schools. 90
F. Resource Allocation
To ensure that having a choice is meaningful, the alternative
schools must be equivalently attractive. Building maintenance, low
student-staff ratio, well designed auditoriums and playing fields, and
adequate computer facilities and libraries all cost money and are fac-
tors that contribute to the relative desirability of magnet schools.
The basic rule must be equal, per capita expenditures within grade
levels throughout the system.
There are, however, certain types of education that are inherently
more expensive. These include drastically reduced class size to per-
mit individualized remedial instruction, extra class periods for stu-
dents who can handle a heavier course load, special equipment and
reduced student-teacher ratio in vocational-technical shop courses,
and summer school. Not every school would be funded to provide
all of these programs. When budgets are tight, districts may bejus-
tified in simply not offering expensive shop courses or unlimited
summer school in every school.
89. Johnson, supra note 80. See Education Law Project, supra note 44, as it relates to
the New York City integration policy.
90. In fashioning a desegregation remedy, federal courts can go beyond ordering
reassignment of students to include "remedial programs in desegregation plans to over-
come the inequalities inherent in dual school systems." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 283-86 (1976). When the predominance of minority students in a school district
necessitates some children attending all-minority schools, courts have ordered special
enhancements at the segregated schools. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d
1277 (8th Cir. 1980); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1984). As
the Liddell court explained, "When no other feasible desegregation techniques exist,
then specific remedial programs for students in the remaining one-race schools may be
included as a means of ensuring equal educational opportunity." 731 F.2d at 1314. For
further discussion, see Education Law Project, supra note 44.
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It is important to deal openly with competing demands for re-
sources and to provide a public forum for setting budget priorities.
Advocates of program enhancements for the highest achieving stu-
dents are often the most vocal. The district must take special care to
protect the interests of average and low-achieving students.
Money is not the only resource that must be equitably allocated.
The all-magnet district must take pains to distribute experienced
and new teachers fairly. Judicious selection of sites for specific pro-
grams is crucial. For instance, school buildings in particularly desir-
able locations should not be used for highly selective programs.
Schools in locations perceived as unsafe or otherwise undesirable
should be given special enhancements such as attended parking lots,
security guards, and attractive, well-maintained physical plants.
Capping enrollment at magnets to ensure small school size may
lead to overcrowding at other schools. Similarly, limiting minority
enrollment at integrated schools may lead to overcrowding at segre-
gated schools. Effective districtwide planning must include close at-
tention to utilization patterns, and timely construction and
rehabilitation of school buildings, so that policies that benefit one
school do not lead to overcrowding another.
Conclusion: Magnet Schools-The Least Dangerous Alternative
Magnets offer the best chance for both quality education and inte-
gration in urban public schools. However, a mixed system of zoned
and magnet schools is likely to result in a few good programs that
take the best students from zoned schools and undermine integra-
tion. Nor will an unplanned laissez-faire system of competitive mag-
nets guarantee quality at every school. Unless there are far more
seats than students, inadequate schools do not get shut down; they
just get assigned the students the other schools do not want. The
students at greatest risk for academic failure and for dropping out
will be forced to attend the schools least able to serve them. The
least dangerous alternative, then, is a planned system of magnet
schools operated with centralized coordination of program choice
and local control over educational decisions.
The New York City high schools illustrate how unplanned devel-
opment of magnets can result in chaos, defeating both equity and
school improvement goals. Such a system can have tragic conse-
quences for the child who is shut out of its "elite schools" and as-
signed to one of its "holding pens," to use the language of the




lem junior high schools, by no means a perfect model, do illustrate
how an effective information system and a combination of district
coordination and school-based initiative can improve the quality of
education systemwide.
Implementing our model magnet plan would be no easy task. Not
only are we asking district officials to buck highly vocal special inter-
ests in order to open up magnets to the full range of students, but
also we are asking them to be the ultimate guarantors of educational
quality. We are asking them not to be satisfied with running a few
good schools for the children of the most affluent or most deter-
mined parents, but rather, to make sure that they are providing every
child with an appropriate and effective education.
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